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This study examines how willingness to cooperate in repeated prisoner's dilemma
games is shaped by the interaction between game parameters and context parameters.
We hypothesize and test that the context parameters trust and time horizon jointly
influence the effectiveness of manipulating the three PD-game parameters benefit,
greed and fear in promoting cooperation. Benefit represents the gain from mutual
cooperation over mutual non-cooperation. Greed represents the gain from opportunism
relative to the payoff from mutual cooperation. Fear represents the loss from being
cheated relative to the payoff from mutual non-cooperation.
That economic behavior is socially and temporally embedded - and therefore not just
based on payoff incentives alone - has been recognized in the literature. In fact, the
roles of payoff incentives, interpersonal dynamics and intertemporal dynamics in
shaping cooperation have been extensively studied in a variety of disciplines.
However, only recently, have the three aspects of any ongoing-social relationship been
integrated into one framework. Hwang and Burgers (1999) proposed that the
interpersonal aspect (trust) and the temporal aspect (time horizon) of a relationship
systematically shape apprehension and temptation, which interact with the payoff
incentives fear and greed, respectively. Apprehension is the inclination to avoid
potential losses. Temptation is the inclination to reap opportunistic gains, respectively.
We aim to test the idea that different configurations of trust and time horizon evoke
different perceptions of apprehension and temptation, which in turn influence the
effect of payoff incentives on cooperation. Specifically, we first propose that different
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combinations of trust and time horizon give rise to different relationships between
apprehension and temptation, which characterize the relational context of an exchange
relationship. We further propose that the effectiveness of reducing greed and fear in
promoting cooperation is contingent upon the nature of this context. Specifically, we
show that reducing greed is more effective than reducing fear in temptation-dominated
contexts, while reducing fear is more effective in apprehension-dominated contexts.
We then present an experiment designed to test these propositions. Within the context
of a prisoner’s dilemma game, we systematically vary payoffs that alter benefit, fear
and greed and examine the impact of these payoff manipulations on willingness to
cooperate in four distinct relational contexts. While most studies have explored the
interpersonal aspect and the intertemporal aspect of the relational context in isolation,
we consider their simultaneous impact. Furthermore, while most studies examine how
interpersonal dynamics, intertemporal dynamics and payoffs shape cooperation, this
paper examines how payoff manipulations most effectively promote cooperation given
interpersonal and intertemporal dynamics.
Overall, our results support the predictions. First, there is a strong indication that
apprehension and temptation are shaped by trust and time horizon collectively. Second,
we find evidence that reducing opportunistic gains is more effective in motivating
cooperation than reducing potential losses when temptation dominates over
apprehension, and vice versa when apprehension dominates over temptation.
VOur study provides empirical evidence for the interdependence of game and context
parameters, and against a context-free utility model, which would predict the same
effectiveness of payoff manipulations across relational contexts. This suggests that a
holistic perspective incorporating both payoffs and context is needed to make sense of
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, and that the effectiveness of strategies
altering payoff incentives must be gauged against the context of a relationship.
1Introduction
Research on self-enforcing agreements suggests that incentive structures, which align
self-interests, help sustain cooperation between independent parties. It has long been
documented in the literature that changes in the payoff structure underlying mixed-
motive interactions affect cooperative behavior. Changing one or more of the payoffs
promotes or impedes cooperation, depending on how the composition of 'benefits from
cooperation', 'gains from opportunistic behavior' and 'losses from being cheated' is
altered (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2001; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989; Poppe and Utens,
1986; Coombs, 1973; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).
In addition to incentive alignment, cooperation can also be fostered by improving the
context of a relationship - along the interpersonal dimension (trust), the intertemporal
dimension (time horizon), or along both. Studies focusing on the interpersonal
dynamics have shown that those who trust their counterparts to cooperate are more
likely to cooperate themselves (Dawes, 1980; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994;
Yamagishi and Sato, 1986). Studies focusing on the intertemporal dynamics have
shown that those who expect a continuing interaction with their counterparts are more
likely to cooperate than those who do not. (e.g., Kreps, 1990; Telser, 1980).
While most studies have discussed interpersonal and intertemporal dynamics
separately, Hwang and Burgers (1999) suggested that trust and time horizon
collectively define the context of an exchange relationship. Specifically, they argued
that the two constructs jointly determine apprehension as well as temptation, which
they define as the inclination to avoid potential losses and the inclination to reap
opportunistic gains, respectively. The more we trust the other party and the longer our
2time horizon, the less apprehensive and the less tempted we will be.
There is no doubt that trust alleviates the concern of exploitation (e.g., Putnam, 1993;
Fukuyama, 1995). But trust does more than that. It also reduces the tendency to behave
opportunistically (e.g., Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998). This is
because a relationship with a more trustworthy party is more predictable and the
trustee hence more valuable as a partner, making the consequence of opportunistic
behavior more severe. In short, the more we trust the more cooperative we will be
because we become more confident that we will not be cheated and because the other
party becomes more valuable to us as a partner. Greater confidence in the other party's
cooperation makes us less apprehensive. Greater reliability of the other party makes us
less tempted.
Time horizon promotes cooperation because a higher likelihood of future interactions
constrains opportunism, as the temporary benefits from cheating today are more likely
to be outweighed by losses to be suffered in the future (Kreps, 1985; Axelrod, 1984;
Telser, 1980). Broken promises in the present will certainly decrease the likelihood of
cooperation in the future. Therefore, more sever the consequences of opportunistic
behavior make us less tempted. But just like a longer time horizon makes us think
twice before an attempt to reap opportunistic gains, it also causes us to be more careful
to defect out of concerns over potential losses. This is because we trade the risk of
incurring potential losses against the risk of foregoing an attractive future of mutual
cooperation when we defect. In other words, defection to avoid being taken advantage
of might be a mistake should the other party cooperate. Therefore, more sever
consequences of this possible mistake keep our apprehension in check. Whether we
defect because we want to reap opportunistic gains or because be want to avoid
3potential losses, defection will certainly decrease the likelihood of cooperation in the
future. This is the more serious a consequence the longer the time horizon. Therefore,
extending time horizon promotes cooperation by keeping both apprehension and
temptation in check as the consequence of defection becomes more severe.
To know that temptation and apprehension rise when either time horizon shortens
and/or trust deteriorates, however, is only the first step towards understanding
cooperative behavior. Until we know how the relative standing of temptation and
apprehension is affected by changes in time horizon and/or trust, we cannot know
whether non-cooperation is more likely to be induced by intolerable fear, irresistible
greed, or both.  We argue that time horizon and trust influence the relative standing of
apprehension and temptation in unique ways.  Specifically, a shortening of time
horizon may render either temptation or apprehension stronger, hinging on the level of
trust.  In contrast, the deterioration of trust always increases apprehension more than
temptation, independent of time horizon. Depending on how trust and time horizon are
configured, one may be more tempted than apprehensive at times and more
apprehensive than tempted at others.
Since payoffs to an exchange are necessarily embedded in a specific relational context,
an interesting question arises: Does the relational context affect the impact of payoff
manipulations (which alter benefit, opportunistic gains, and/or potential losses from
being cheated) on cooperation?
We expect that the effectiveness of payoff manipulations aiming to motivate
cooperation varies systematically with the relational context. In a context in which
temptation is stronger than apprehension, reducing the size of gains from opportunistic
4behavior is expected to be more effective in motivating cooperation than reducing the
size of potential losses from being cheated. In a context in which apprehension is
stronger than temptation, however, the reverse is expected.
We test these propositions with the help of a prisoner’s dilemma game. We
systematically vary incentives (by altering payoff outcomes) and examine the
effectiveness of such manipulations under distinct trust-time horizon combinations.
Our findings suggest that reducing opportunistic gains could be more or less effective
than reducing potential losses, depending on how trust interacts with time horizon.
In the next section we review the literature on payoff incentives, trust, and time
horizon and develop our hypotheses.  In section two we describe the experimental
design and procedures. Section three presents our results. Section four concludes.
51. Game Parameters and Context Parameters
1.1 Game Parameters: Benefit, Greed and Fear
It has long been documented in the literature that three payoff incentives underlie
mixed-motive interactions: benefit from cooperation, gains from opportunism and
potential losses from being cheated (see Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Schmidt et al.,
2001). These incentives can be illustrated with the help of prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
games.
A prisoner's dilemma game is played by two players who each have the choice
between cooperation (C) and non-cooperation (N). Each player’s payoff is a function
of his and his opponent’s choice. We identify a player’s payoffs by payoff functions
with two arguments, p(1,2), the first being the player’s own choice of action, the
second being the other player’s choice. To be of PD type, a game’s payoff matrix must
have the property p(N,C) > p(C,C) > p(N,N) > p(C,N). If both players choose to
cooperate they receive their Pareto-efficient payoff p(C,C). If one player chooses to
cooperate and the other player defects, then the defector receives his temptation payoff
p(N,C), and the other player receives the sucker payoff p(C,N). If both choose their
dominant strategy and defect, they both end up with the second smallest
payoff p(N,N), which is the unique Nash equilibrium. See Figure 1.
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Rapoport and Chammah (1965) translated the PD-game structure into three incentives:
p(C,C) - p(N,N) referred to as benefit,
p(N,C) - p(C,C) referred to as greed, and
p(N,N) - p(C,N) referred to as fear.
Greed, p(N,C) - p(C,C), and fear, p(N,N) - p(C,N), constitute incentives against
cooperation while benefit, p(C,C) - p(N,N), encourages cooperation in prospect of
long-term rewards from cooperation  (e.g Rapoport, 1967; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy,
1989; Dawes et al., 1986; Poppe and Utens, 1986; Coombs, 1973; Hwang and Burgers,
1999; Schmidt et al., 2001).
Empirical studies have shown that greater benefit increases cooperation (Komorita et
al., 1980), while greater fear and greed decrease cooperation (Rapoport and Chammah,
1965; Rapoport, 1988; Saijo and Nakamura, 1995; Schmidt et al., 2001; Clark and
Sefton, 2001).  These findings are robust in finitely repeated as well as one-shot PD
games; despite the fact that non-cooperation is the theoretical Nash equilibrium for
each player in one-shot interactions (Orbell & Dawes, 1993; Axelrod, 1984; Selten and
Stoecker, 1986; Roth, 1988).
7In summary the greater the payoff form cooperation, the lower the potential gain from
defecting and the lower the potential loss from being cheated, the higher the levels of
cooperation in mixed-motive interactions.
1.2 Context Parameters: Trust and Time Horizon
A growing body of literature suggests that human behavior in social interactions is
based on other parameters than just game parameters alone (Arrow, 1974, Raub and
Weesie, 1990). Economic behavior does not occur in a vacuum but is necessarily
embedded in the context of specific interactions (Granovetter, 1985). It is widely
accepted in the literature, that the context in which a social dilemma is embedded,
influences people's willingness to cooperate. Social dilemmas have been studied in a
variety of contexts, economic and social (See Allison et. al (1996) for a review), and
the conclusion generally is that the context in which a social dilemma is embedded is a
crucial determinant of human behavior. In the theoretical as well as empirical literature
on social dilemmas, trust and time horizon, characterizing the interpersonal and the
intertemporal dynamics of a relationship respectively, have emerged as two dominant
areas of research.
The importance of trust and time horizon in cooperative relationships has been widely
discussed across social science disciplines. While trust has traditionally been a popular
topic in disciplines such as psychology, sociology, political science, and business, time
horizon has taken a central role in game theory and economics.
Researchers generally agree that trust refers to a party’s beliefs about the likely
behavior of the other party that matter to the trustor’s decision making (e.g. Hardin,
81991; Burt and Knez, 1996). Gambetta (1988: p.217) maintains that trust is "the
probability that one economic actor will make decisions and take actions that will be
beneficial or at least not detrimental to another."  Burt & Knez (1996) defined trust
simply as "anticipated cooperation".  Ross and LaCroix (1996) define trust as “one
party’s willingness to risk increasing his or her vulnerability to another (or others)
whose behavior is beyond one’s control; thus, the party is confident that the other will
not exploit the party’s vulnerabilities.” As such trust has a strong bearing on one’s
choice of action (Dasgupta, 1988). Arrow (1974) claims that an element of trust exists
in every transaction and that without trust, there can be no cooperation.  Similarly,
scholars have argued that trust is essential to produce socially efficient outcomes and
to avoid inefficient non-cooperative traps (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995).
Trust may be based on the other’s payoff incentives, a belief in the predictability of the
other’s behavior (e.g., Deutsch, 1958), the expectation of reciprocity (e.g., Ostrom,
1998) or a full internalization of the other’s desires and intentions (e.g., Rousseau et
al., 1998). Whatever the motivation behind trust, ample evidence from laboratory
studies supports that those who expect their counterparts to cooperate are more likely
to cooperate themselves (Dawes, 1980; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Yamagishi
and Sato, 1986; Glaeser et al., 2000).
How does trust promote cooperation?  Trust researchers unanimously agree that trust
alleviates the trustor's fear of being taken advantage of (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama,
1995). In addition to easing concerns of being cheated, Hwang and Burgers (1997)
recently argued that trust also contains the trustor's desire to reap opportunistic gains.
This is because opportunism is likely to put an end to a relationship, causing the loss of
a trustworthy partner (e.g., Axelrod; 1984; Kreps, 1990). In general, high trust suggests
9that benefits from cooperation are more predictable, making the trustee hence more
valuable as a partner (Nooteboom, Berger, and Nooderhaven, 1997; Whitener, Brodt,
Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). To the extent that loosing a trustworthy partner implies
foregoing future beneficial interactions, one would be less prone to act
opportunistically. In organization literature, Elangovan & Shapiro (1998) maintained
that the more positive the assessment of the trustee’s cooperative propensity, the more
we feel there is to be lost than gained by betrayal. Thus, trust not only eases the
trustor's concern of being taken advantage of but also contains his/her desire to reap
opportunistic gains.
Researchers also agree that the expectation of a continuing interaction shapes
cooperation, too (e.g., Heide and Miner, 1992; Andreoni and Miller 1993; Murnighan
and Roth, 1983; Kreps et al., 1982). Choice behavior in relation to future consequences
that are spread out in time has been extensively studied in economics (Kreps, 1990).
Several empirical studies confirm that the expectation of an on-going interaction is an
important determinant of cooperation (e.g., Heide and Miner, 1992; Clark and Sefton,
2001; Murnighan and Roth, 1983). Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1994) find evidence, that an expectation of future interactions with the
same partner positively affects cooperation rates (see also Clark and Sefton, 2001).
Murnighan and Roth (1983) show that the likelihood of a game terminating clearly is a
major determinant of cooperation in mixed-motive interactions.
How does time horizon promote cooperation? When the likelihood of future
interactions increases, temporary benefits from cheating today are more likely to be
outweighed by retaliatory punishments delivered in the future (Kreps, 1990; Axelrod
1984). Telser (1980) argued that the expectation of gains from mutual cooperation in
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the future casts a shadow back upon the present, affecting current behavior. The
implicit assumption of these arguments is that forward-looking expectations of gains
hold in check proclivity towards agreement violations. Put differently, the more
sustained positive payoffs from mutual cooperation extend into the future, the more
time horizon contains our desire to reap one-time opportunistic gains. In addition, time
horizon, for similar reasons, also holds back our proclivity to defect out of fear of
being taken advantage of. This is again because a longer time horizon implies a more
valuable future. Just like we refrain from defecting in order not to trade the valuable
future for one-time gains, we might also refrain in order not to jeopardize potential
gains from mutual cooperation because we are afraid that we might suffer losses. We
might expect the other party to defect, but unless trust is zero, there is a chance that
he/she might actually cooperate. Should we choose non-cooperation in order to avoid
losses from being taken advantage of, but the other party actually cooperates, we
would lose the lucrative future stream of income that mutual cooperation would have
resulted in. In this sense, defection is a risky option that we are less inclined to choose,
when time horizon, and therefore the consequence of unilateral defection, increases.
Intuitively, we are more inclined to give cooperation a try when the future casts a
longer shadow onto the present. The longer the time horizon, the more our inclination
to defect out of fear is kept in check. Thus, time horizon not only keeps in check one's
desire for opportunistic gains but also one's tendency to defect because of concerns
over potential losses.
Although for different reasons, trust and time horizon both promote cooperation by
reducing the desire to reap opportunistic gains as well as that to avoid potential losses.
Put differently, the more trust we have in the other party and the longer our time
horizon, the less apprehensive and tempted we will be. We define apprehension as the
11
inclination to avoid potential losses and temptation as the inclination to reap
opportunistic gains.
While trust alleviates apprehension by giving us confidence in the other party, time
horizon keeps it in check, as we might not want to unilaterally defect and damage a
valuable future income stream. And while disutility of losing a reliable partner lies
behind why trust contains temptation, time horizon keeps temptation in check because
opportunistic behavior is likely to entail more severe retaliatory punishment in the
future. Therefore, improving either a decision-maker's trust or time horizon will reduce
his/her apprehension as well as his/her temptation. Figure 2 summarizes how trust and
time horizon promote cooperation through reducing apprehension and temptation.
Figure 2. How Trust and Time Horizon Promote Cooperation Through Reducing
                Apprehension and Temptation
Because trust and time horizon both foster cooperation through alleviating fear and
containing greed, they collectively shape apprehension and temptation and form the





Greater confidence in partner:
An increase in trust reduces the
decision-maker's (trustor's)
apprehension as the trustee is less
likely to take advantage of the
decision maker.
More reliable partner:
 An increase in trust reduces the
decision-makers (trustor's)
temptation as the trustee becomes
more valuable as a partner.
Greater willingness to give
cooperation a try
An increase in the decision maker's time
horizon reduces his/her apprehension as
the consequence of not giving
cooperation a try becomes more severe.
More severe punishment:
An increase in the decision-maker's
time horizon reduces his/her
temptation as the consequence of
opportunism becomes more severe.
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relational context (Hwang and Burgers, 1999). In other words, they mold the character
of the relational context through apprehension and temptation (see Hwang and
Burgers, 1999). We argue that different configurations of trust and time horizon will
produce different characters of the relational context; in some we will be more
apprehensive than tempted and vice versa in others.
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1.3 Relational Context and the Impact of Game Parameters on Cooperation
Figure 3 shows how different combinations of trust and time horizon give rise to four
unique relational contexts in which payoff incentives are embedded.
Figure 3.   Variants of Relational Context
We first examine how the absolute intensities of the decision-maker's apprehension
and temptation are shaped by his/her trust and time horizon. Figure 3 suggests that
temptation and apprehension are both low when trust and time horizon are both high
(scenario 1) and both high when trust and time horizon are both low (scenario 4), with
scenarios 2 and 3 in between. Holding time horizon constant, Figure 3 suggests that
apprehension and temptation rise when trust declines and vice versa.  Similarly,






































As trust and time horizon concurrently mold the character of the relational context,
knowing only one of the two parameters is not enough to predict cooperation. Given a
certain level of trust, shortening the trustor's time horizon will result in lower
willingness to cooperate. Similarly, given a certain level of time horizon, reducing the
decision maker's expectation that the other party will cooperate (trust) will also result
in lower cooperation rates. We hypothesize that willingness to cooperation is highest in
scenario 1, in which the decision-maker's trust and time horizon are both high, lowest
in scenario 4, in which his/her trust and time horizon are both low, and in-between in
scenarios 2 and 3. For a group of decision-maker we expect cooperation rates to vary
accordingly across the four scenarios.
Hypothesis 1: Cooperation rates are highest in scenario 1, lowest in scenario 4 and
in-between in scenarios 2 and 3.
We have argued that the decision-maker's apprehension and temptation will decline
when his/her trust and/or time horizon increase. But how do trust and time horizon
alter the relative standing of apprehension and temptation? Our discussion above
suggests that reducing apprehension and temptation are the two common mechanisms
through which trust and time horizon promote cooperation. To know that temptation
and apprehension become stronger when either trust deteriorates and/or time horizon
shortens, however, is only the first step towards understanding cooperative behavior.
Until we know how the relative standing of apprehension and temptation is affected by
changes in trust and/or time horizon, we cannot know whether non-cooperation is more
likely to be hindered because the decision maker faces potential losses (fear) or
because he/she is presented with opportunistic gains (greed). Remember that
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apprehension represents the inclination to avoid potential losses while temptation that
to reap opportunistic gains.
We now compare the level of apprehension with that of temptation within each of the
four relational contexts. We argue that the decision-maker's trust in the other party and
his/her time horizon influence the relative standing of his/her apprehension and
temptation in unique ways: When he/she loses trust apprehension always increases
more than temptation, independent of how long his/her time horizon is. In contrast, if
his/her time horizon shortens either the increase in his/her temptation or that in his/her
apprehension will be stronger, hinging on the level of trust.
To see that apprehension relative to temptation grows when trust deteriorates, we
return to the PD payoff structure (see Figure 4). Assume the column player is the
decision-maker, whose trust in the row player is Q.





  Row Player
                        (1-Q) N  p(C,N) p(N,N)
Q = probability that the row player chooses to cooperate (C).
The more the column player trusts the row player (the higher Q), the more likely it is
that he/she will obtain p(N,C) rather than p(N,N) should he/she choose non-
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cooperation and p(C,C) rather than p(C,N) should he/she choose cooperation. In the
extreme case, when the column player trusts the row player completely, a choice of
non-cooperation is certain to yield p(N,C) and a choice of cooperation is certain to
yield p(C,C). As opportunistic gains (p(N,C) - p(C,C)) become more certain while
potential losses ((p(N,N) - p(C,N)) more unlikely when the column player's trust in the
row player increases, his/her temptation relative to apprehension grows. This is true for
any level of time horizon. As opportunistic gains (p(N,C) - p(C,C)) are relatively
certain while potential losses ((p(N,N) - p(C,N)) unlikely when trust is high,
temptation is expected to be stronger than apprehension in scenarios 1 and 2. We
hypothesize that scenarios 1 and 2 are temptation dominant contexts.
Hypothesis 2: Scenario 1 and scenario 2 are temptation dominant contexts.
Conversely, the more the column player distrusts the row player, the more cooperation
is unlikely to yield p(C,C), and non-cooperation to yield p(N,C). In the extreme case,
when the column player has no trust in the row player at all, a choice of non-
cooperation is certain to yield p(N,N) and a choice of cooperation is certain to yield
p(C,N).  As potential losses (p(N,N) - p(C,N)) become more certain while
opportunistic gains (p(N,C) - p(C,C)) more unlikely when trust decreases, the column
player's apprehension grows relative to his temptation. This again is the case for any
level of time horizon. As potential losses (p(N,N) - p(C,N)) are relatively certain while
opportunistic gains (p(N,C) - p(C,C)) unlikely when trust is low, apprehension is
expected to be stronger than temptation in scenario 3 and 4.  We hypothesize that
scenarios 3 and 4 are apprehension dominant contexts.
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Hypothesis 3: Scenario 3 and scenario 4 are apprehension dominant contexts.
To see how the level of trust affects whether apprehension or temptation grows more
when time horizon shortens, consider that a shorter time horizon on one hand implies
less severe consequences of acting opportunistically, while on the other hand less a
incentive to give cooperation a try. While the former makes the decision-maker more
tempted, the latter makes him/her more apprehensive. Which of these two effects has a
stronger impact depends on the level of trust.
As opportunistic gains (p(N,C) - p(C,C)) are relatively certain while potential losses
unlikely when trust is high, opportunism is attractive and being cheated not much of a
concern. When, in this context, the other party’s ability to punish is increasingly
constrained as time horizon shortens, opportunism becomes more attractive to the
decision-maker, whereas his/her willingness to give cooperation a try is not much
discouraged, implying that his/her temptation grows more than his/her apprehension. A
moment of reflection suggests that opportunism is arguably most attractive when the
opportunity to reap opportunistic gains presents itself (i.e., high trust) while the
likelihood of "getting away with it" is high (i.e., short-time horizon) (e.g., Elangovan
& Shapiro, 1998, see also Granovetter, 1985). Moreover, intuition suggests that, in the
extreme case of a one-shot interaction with a completely trusted partner, there is no
apprehension but only infinite temptation. We therefore expect temptation dominance
to be more pronounced in scenario 2 where trust is high and time horizon short than in
scenario 1 where trust and time horizon are both high.
Hypothesis 4: Temptation dominance is more pronounced in scenario 2 than in
scenario 1.
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In contrast, as potential losses (p(N,N) - p(C,N)) are relatively certain while
opportunistic gains (p(N,C) - p(C,C)) unlikely when trust is low, getting cheated is of
great concern and opportunism not very attractive. When, in this context, the
possibility of a future stream of payoffs from mutual cooperation is increasingly
constraint as time horizon shortens, his/her willingness to give cooperation a try is
discouraged whereas opportunism becomes only a little more attractive to him/her,
implying that apprehension grows more than temptation. We therefore expect
apprehension dominance to be more pronounced in scenario 4 where trust is low and
time horizon short than in scenario 3 where trust is low but time horizon long.
Hypothesis 5: Apprehension dominance is more pronounced in scenario 4 than in
scenario 3.
In summary, we not only argue that temptation outweighs apprehension in scenarios 1
and 2 and apprehension temptation in scenarios 3 and 4, but also that temptation and
apprehension dominance are more pronounced when time horizon is short (in scenarios
2 and 4). This is depicted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5.   Apprehension Compared to Temptation within Scenarios
Finally, we argue that neither game parameters nor context parameters alone, but the
interaction of both determines willingness to cooperate. Specifically, the interpersonal
context parameter trust and the intertemporal context parameter time horizon jointly
form apprehension and temptation, which in turn interact with the game parameters
fear and greed, respectively. Apprehension determines the impact of fear on
willingness to cooperate and temptation that of greed. It follows that whether fear or
greed is the primary threat to cooperation hinges not only on the size of greed and fear
but also on the intensity of apprehension compared to that of temptation (Hwang and
Burgers, 1999). It is the strength of these two forces combined, relative to benefit,
which shapes cooperation. The Interaction between game and context parameters is
































*TDC = Temptation Dominant Context,
  ADC = Apprehension Dominant Context.
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Figure 6.  How Context Parameters and Game Parameters Interact to Shape
                 Cooperation
Since non-cooperation implies that benefits from cooperation are not sufficient to
overcome greed and fear, the underlying cause of non-cooperation could either be
attributed to irresistible greed, intolerable fear, or both. When the amounts of greed
and fear are equal, it is the strength of apprehension compared to that of temptation
that determines whether fear or greed is the dominant incentive against cooperation. As
the configuration of trust and time horizon holds the key to understanding the
relationship between apprehension and temptation, it also holds the key to
understanding how to best promote cooperation, given trust and time horizon.
 This leads to the thesis of this study that payoff manipulations are expected to be
differently effective in different relational contexts. Reducing greed and fear certainly
increases willingness to cooperate, but we expect that the same amount of change will










greed should be more effective than reducing fear when the decision-maker is more
tempted than apprehensive - as greed is expected to have a greater impact on
cooperation than fear under this circumstance. By the same token, when he/she is more
apprehensive than tempted, reducing fear should be more effective than reducing
greed.
We examine two pairs of payoff manipulations. We compare the effect of changing
p(N,C) with that of changing p(C,N), and that of changing p(C,C) with that of
changing  p(N,N) on willingness to cooperate. As p(N,C) affects greed and p(C,N)
affects fear, we hypothesize that changes in p(N,C) and changes in p(C,N)
motivates/impede cooperation differently strongly in the different relational contexts.
As p(C,C) affects greed and p(N,N) affects fear but both affect benefit, we expected
the same to be true for changes in p(C,C) and  p(N,N).
Specifically, we expect that decreasing p(N,C), which reduces greed, should motivate
cooperation more than increasing p(C,N), which reduces fear, when the decision-
maker is in temptation dominant contexts (scenarios 1 and 2) and vice versa when
he/she is in  apprehension dominant contexts (scenarios 3 and 4).  Similarly increasing
p(N,C), which increases greed should impede cooperation more than decreasing
p(C,N), which increases fear in temptation dominant contexts (scenarios 1 and 2) and
vice versa in  apprehension dominant contexts (scenarios 3 and 4).
Hypothesis 6: In scenarios 1 and 2, changes in p(N,C) have a greater impact on
willingness to cooperate than equally large changes in p(C,N).
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Hypothesis 7: In scenarios 3 and 4, changes in p(N,C) have a smaller impact on
willingness to cooperate than equally large changes in p(C,N).
Similarly, increasing p(C,C), which increases benefit and reduces greed, should
motivate cooperation more than decreasing p(N,N), which increases benefit and
reduces fear, in temptation dominant contexts (scenarios 1 and 2), and vice versa in
apprehension dominant contexts (scenarios 3 and 4). Similarly, decreasing p(C,C),
which decreases benefit and increases greed, should impede cooperation more than
increasing p(N,N), which decreases benefit and increases fear, in temptation dominant
contexts (scenarios 1 and 2), and vice versa in apprehension dominant contexts
(scenarios 3 and 4).
Hypothesis 8: In scenarios 1 and 2, changes in p(C,C) have a greater impact on
willingness to cooperate than equally large changes in p(N,N).
Hypothesis 9: In scenarios 3 and 4, changes in p(C,C) have a smaller impact on
willingness to cooperate than equally large changes in p(N,N).
Table 1 summarizes how the impact of payoff manipulations on willingness to
cooperate hinges on the relational context.
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Table 1.  Payoff Manipulations that Motivate/Impede Cooperation
Payoff  Manipulation Implication Impact on Cooperation*
decrease in p(N,C)
           vs.
increase in p(C,N)
gain less from cheating
                vs.
 lose less if cheated
more effective in TDC
              vs.













            vs.
decrease in p(N,N)
benefit more from cooperation
and gain less from cheating
                vs.
benefit more from cooperation
and lose less if cheated
more effective in TDC
              vs.
more effective in ADC
increase in p(N,C)
         vs.
decrease in p(C,N)
gain more from cheating
               vs.
lose more if cheated
more effective in TDC
              vs.
more effective in ADC











         vs.
increase in p(N,N)
benefit less from cooperation
and gain more from cheating
                vs.
benefit less from cooperation
and lose more if cheated
more effective in TDC
              vs.
more effective in ADC
*TDC = Temptation Dominant Context,
  ADC = Apprehension Dominant Context
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2. Experimental Design and Procedure
The purpose of this study was to test the idea that different relational contexts will
evoke different perceptions of apprehension and temptation, which in turn will shape
the impact of payoff manipulations (which alter benefit, fear and greed) on
cooperation. To achieve this we used prisoner's dilemma games. They are ideal for our
purpose. Firstly, PD games provide incentives for both competitive and cooperative
actions. Secondly, PD games allow the testing of context effects as they themselves are
context-free.
We conducted an experiment to test the hypotheses developed under the previous
section. 180 undergraduate business students from the National University of
Singapore voluntarily took part in the experiment. Each participant played the PD-
game shown in Figure 7 under the four scenarios depicted in Table 2.
Figure 7. Baseline Game
YOU
Option A Option B
Option A 450 600
OTHER
PERSON
Option B 150 300
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Horizon      Nature of Relational Context
Scenario 1 90% 90% Low Temptation    >   Low Apprehension
Scenario 2 90% 10% Mid Temptation   >>   Mid Apprehension
Scenario 3 10% 90% Mid Temptation    <    Mid Apprehension
Scenario 4 10% 10% High Temptation  <<  High Apprehension
Note that the amounts of fear (300-150) and greed (600-450) are the same in the PD-
game across all scenarios. The scenarios are composed of different combinations of
trust and time horizon, each expected to give rise to one of the different relational
contexts suggested by Figure 5. We chose probabilities of 0.1 and 0.9 to represent low
and high levels of trust and time horizon. We expect the combination of these rather
extreme values to evoke clearly the four distinct relational contexts depicted in Figure
5.
Trust was operationalized as the probability that the other person would cooperate
(choose Option A)1. All participants played the PD-game with the probability that the
other person would cooperate varying from scenarios one and two to scenarios three
and four. In scenarios 1 and 2, participants were informed that there was a 90% chance
that the other person would choose Option A. In scenarios 3 and 4, participants were
informed that there was a 10% chance that the other person would choose Option A.
Time horizon was operationalized as the probability that the PD-game would continue.
All participants played the PD-game with the probability that the game would continue
                                                
1 In this paper, we are interested in the influence of trust on willingness to cooperate
rather than the sources of trust. Operationalizing trust as the probability that the other
party will cooperate allows us to study the impact of trust on cooperation without
necessarily drawing on any particular motivation.
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varying from one scenario to the next. In scenarios 1 and 3, participants were informed
that there was a 90% chance that the game would have another round. In scenarios 2
and 4, participants were informed that there was a 10% chance that the game would
have another round. While participants were told that the termination of the repeated
PD-games would be determined probabilistically, participants in fact played six rounds
in scenario 1, two rounds in scenario 2, seven rounds in scenario 3, and two rounds in
scenario 42. Note that they did not know at any time, the exact number of rounds for
each scenario.
We expect scenarios 1 and 2 to be temptation dominant contexts and scenarios 3 and 4
to be apprehension dominant contexts. Moreover, we expect temptation dominance to
be more pronounced in scenario 2 than in scenario 1 and apprehension dominance to
be more pronounced in scenario 4 than in scenario 3.
At the start of the experiment participants were informed that at the end of the
experimental session they would receive S$10 for participation, and additional S$50
(two weeks later) if they were among the top-ten performers. The entire experiment
was conducted by computer and lasted approximately 45 minutes. Subjects were told
to maximize their own payoff without regard for the other party and they were assured
that their decisions would remain anonymous throughout and after the experiment and
that decisions would not carry moral implications.
                                                
2 While it is not necessary to obtain data after the first round to test the hypotheses, a
repeated game design however is instrumental to reflect the notion of time horizon.
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Subjects were first introduced to the PD-game payoff presentation. They saw their own
payoffs only but knew that the other party also faced a PD payoff structure, the exact
payoffs of which they however did not know. This is not only a more realistic
assumption as the other party’s payoffs are rarely known in reality but also necessary
as it reflects the idea that the level of trust already incorporates the expected influence
of the other party’s payoffs on that party's behavior. A payoff structure more
conducive to cooperation, for instance, would result in a higher trust level.
After having introduced the PD-payoff presentation, subjects were given written
instructions (see Appendix A) introducing them to the notions of trust and time horizon
and their task. Training rounds to familiarize them with the computer interface and our
operationalization of trust and time horizon followed.
After this subjects were informed about the actual four scenarios under which they
would play the PD-game. They were required to complete a quiz before they were able
to proceed. The quiz consisted of four questions that could not be answered unless one
understood the different nature of the scenarios. Most participants were able to
complete the quiz with little difficulty.
Subjects then proceeded to actually play the repeated PD-game under the four
scenarios. Previous research (Roth and Murnighan, 1978) indicated that the order of
play had no effect on the player’s choices. Thus players played the four repeated
games in the same order (see also Murnighan and Roth, 1983): first scenario 1,
followed by scenario 2, scenario 3, and scenario 4. Subjects were told that they would
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play against a different person in each scenario. They actually played against the
computer, which played a tit-for-tat strategy3.
After subjects had made their decision for the first round under each scenario and
before knowing their partner's decision, we examined what motivated cooperative and
non-cooperative action. We asked subjects who chose Option B (non-cooperation) 4 to
indicate (on a 7-point scale) to what extent they agreed with the statements5:
'I choose Option B in an attempt to get 600 in this round.'
'I choose Option B because if I choose Option A I am afraid of getting only 150'.
We then examined to what extent changes to the payoff structure make subjects more
willing to change their decision in favor of the other option. We administered two
conditions. Under condition 1 we compared the impact of changing p(N,C) with that of
changing p(C,N) on willingness to cooperate. Note that by changing p(NC) we change
greed and by changing p(C,N) we change fear. Under condition 2 we compared the
impact of changing p(C,C) with that of changing p(N,N) on willingness to cooperate.
Note that by changing p(C,C) we change greed and benefit and by changing p(N,N)
we change fear and benefit.
                                                
3 We could have used other strategies, but tit-for-tat reasonably simulates the
continuous play of a human counterpart.
4 We do not examine reasons for cooperation as cooperators’ temptation and
apprehension levels are necessarily low for cooperation to be possible. We therefore
don’t expect to see the contrast between apprehension and temptation as in the case of
non-cooperation. Moreover, as previous studies have indicated that the level of
cooperation is generally low, we expect the overall number of cooperators to be lower
than that of non-cooperators.
5 See Appendix B for the computer interface used.
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We randomly assigned 90 subjects to condition 1 and 90 subjects to condition 2. Under
condition 1 we colored p(N,C) green and p(C,N) red. We asked cooperators (those
who chose Option A) to indicate (on a 7-point scale) to what extent they agreed with
the following statements:
'With 700 in the green cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.'
'With 50 in the red cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.' 6
Note that these payoff manipulations increase greed and fear by 100 units relative to
the baseline game (Figure 7) and are expected to reduce willingness to cooperate.
We asked non-cooperators (those who chose Option B) to indicate to what extent they
agreed with the following statements:
'With 500 in the green cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.'
'With 250 in the red cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.'
Note that these payoff manipulations decrease greed and fear by 100 units relative to
the baseline game (Figure 7) and are expected to increase willingness to cooperate.
Under condition 2 we colored p(C,C) green and p(N,N) red and asked cooperators
(those who chose Option A) to indicate (on a 7-point scale) to what extent they agreed
with the following statements:
                                                
6  See Appendix B for the computer interface used.
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'With 350 in the green cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.'
'With 400 in the red cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.'
Note that these payoff manipulations increase greed and fear while at the same time
decrease benefit by 100 units relative to the base line game and are expected to reduce
willingness to cooperate.
We asked non-cooperators (those who chose Option B) to indicate to what extent they
agreed with the following statements:
'With 550 in the green cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.'
'With 200 in the red cell, I would probably have chosen the other option.'
Note that these payoff manipulations decrease greed and fear while at the same time
increase benefit by 100 units relative to the base line game and are expected to increase
willingness to cooperate.
Our payoff manipulations aim at motivating cooperators to choose non-cooperation
and non-cooperators to choose cooperation.  Specifically, we motive non-cooperation
by increasing greed and fear and cooperation by decreasing greed and fear.  For each
condition this allows us to compare the effectiveness of changing greed with that of
changing fear in all four scenarios.7
                                                
7 Since manipulations to p(C,C) and p(N,N) have the same impact on benefit from
cooperation, and manipulations to p(C,N) and p(N,C)have no impact on benefit,
changes in benefit from cooperation therefore do not affect this comparison.
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Figure 8 depicts payoff manipulations associated with the subject’s choice between
option A and option B and the implications of these manipulations on benefit, greed,
and fear.
Figure 8.  Payoff Manipulations and Their Effect on Incentives 
Condition 1
Condition 2
 After completing the questions, subjects were informed about the other person's action
and continued to play until the termination point of the repeated PD-game in each
scenario. No further questions were asked except for their decisions whether to
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Table 3 shows that cooperation rates vary substantially across scenarios. First-round
cooperation rates are highest in scenario 1, in which 89 out of the 180 subjects (49%)
cooperated, lowest in scenario 4, in which only 22 subjects (12%) cooperated, and in
between in scenarios 2 and 3, in which 39 and 40 subjects (22%) cooperated.8  One-
tailed proportion Z-tests revealed that 22% is significantly lower than 49% (Z = 5.505,
p < 0.001) and that 12% is significantly lower than 22% (Z = 2.513, p < 0.006).  The
results support hypothesis 1.















Scenario 1 180 49% 54% 56% 52% 51% 51%
Scenario 2 180 22% 20%
Scenario 3 180 22% 36% 34% 29% 32% 25% 28%
Scenario 4 180 12% 18%
                                                
8 Sixty nine subjects did not cooperate in any of the four initial rounds while five
subjects cooperated in all.
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3.2 Apprehension Dominant versus Temptation Dominant Contexts
Figure 9 depicts non-cooperators’ perception of what motivates their non-cooperative
action. There is no one reason behind non-cooperation that prevails in all four
scenarios.
Figure 9. Temptation verses Apprehension as Motivators of Non-Cooperation
Trust :                         90                   90                   10
10Time Horizon :          90                   10                   90
10






Whether greed or fear is the primary factor that causes benefits to be insufficient for
cooperation to emerge depends not only on the amount of greed and fear but also on
the relational context. Our findings suggest that subjects chose non-cooperation in an
attempt to get the temptation payoff 600 rather than in order to avoid the sucker payoff






Trust:     90              90              10              10
Time Horizon:     90               10              90              10
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t2 = 13.532, a<0.001). In scenarios three and four subjects choose non-cooperation in
order to avoid the sucker payoff 150 rather than attempt to get the temptation payoff
600. The difference in means again is significant (t3 = -4.857, a<0.001; t4 = -3.925,
a<0.001).
Given the equal amounts of greed and fear in the PD-game's payoff structure that we
used in all four scenarios, variations in the reasons for non-cooperation can only be
attributed to the different natures of the relational contexts. Specifically, the results
suggest that temptation impedes cooperation more than apprehension in scenarios 1
and 2, but that apprehension impedes cooperation more than temptation in scenarios 3
and 4. This suggests that scenarios 1 and 2 are indeed temptation dominant contexts,
and scenarios 3 and 4 apprehension dominant contexts.
That temptation for opportunistic gains rather than apprehension of potential losses is
the stronger force against cooperation in scenarios 1 and 2 and that apprehension of
potential losses rather than temptation for opportunistic gains is the stronger force
against cooperation in scenarios 3 and 4, supports hypothesis 2 and 3.
T-tests did not reveal that temptation dominance is stronger in scenario 2 than 1 at a
significance level of 0.1 (t = 0.039, ns at 0.1 level). We suspect that since non-
cooperators in scenario 1 are already too tempted to cooperate, the expected additional
level of temptation above apprehension is therefore not observed in scenario 2. For the
same reason, we do not observe the expected stronger desire to obtain the temptation
payoff in scenario 2. T-tests also did not reveal that apprehension dominance is
stronger in scenario 4 than 3 (t = -1.316, ns at 0.1 level). We suspect that since non-
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cooperators in scenario 3 are already too apprehensive to cooperate, the expected
additional level of apprehension above temptation is therefore not observed in scenario
4.
It is however possible to infer the degree of temptation dominance and apprehension
dominance from cooperation rates. As scenarios 1 and 2 are both temptation dominant
contexts, a proportion test suggests that the lower cooperation rate for scenario 2 is
indicative of stronger temptation dominance in scenario 2 (Z = 5.505, a<0.001).
Similarly, as scenarios three and four are both apprehension dominant contexts, a
lower cooperation rate for scenario 4 (Z = 2.513, a<0.012) suggests that apprehension
dominance is stronger in scenario 4. This provides some support for hypotheses 4 and
5.
In order to investigate further hypotheses 3a and 3b, we decided to look into the
responses from those subjects who cooperated in scenario 1 but not in scenario 2 and
into those from subjects who cooperated in scenario 3 but not in scenario 4. As we
expect greater temptation but not so much greater apprehension to discourages
cooperation more in scenario 2 than in scenario 1, we expect that some of the
cooperators, who can resist greed when time horizon is long (scenario 1), are no longer
able to do so when it is short (scenario 2).  Similarly, as we expect greater
apprehension but not so much greater temptation to discourages cooperation more in
scenario 4 than in scenario 3, we expect that some of the cooperators, who can tolerate
fear when time horizon is long (scenario 3), are no longer able to do so when it is short
(scenario 4).
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Fifty subjects cooperated in scenario 1 but not in scenario 2, twenty five cooperated in
scenario 3 but not in scenario 4. By looking at these subjects we found further
indications that temptation grows more than apprehension when time horizon declines
while trust is high. We however did not find further indications that apprehension
grows more than temptation when time horizon declines while trust is low.    
Subjects who cooperated when trust was high and time horizon long (scenario 1) but
did not when time horizon was short (scenario 2) indicated that they chose non-
cooperation more in an attempt to obtain the temptation payoff than because of the
desire to avoid the sucker payoff (t = 8.580, a<0.001). This finding therefore provides
an indication that temptation compared to apprehension grew when time horizon
declined in the high trust context.
Subjects who cooperated in scenario 3 but did not in scenario 4 did not indicate that
the desire to avoid the sucker payoff discouraged cooperation more than the desire to
get the temptation payoff (t=1.809, ns at 0.1 level). This therefore does not provide any
indication that apprehension compared to temptation grew when time horizon declined
in the low trust context. This might be because subjects of this group by nature are
very tempted and not so much concerned about being cheated in the first round. In fact,
nineteen of these subjects did not cooperate in scenarios 2, and 10 did not cooperate in
scenario 1.
In summary, our results regarding the nature of the relational context show that non-
cooperation can be attributed to temptation more than apprehension when trust is high
(scenarios 1 and 2). Evidence from non-cooperators however does not indicate that a
shorter time horizon renders temptation stronger compared to apprehension in scenario
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2 than scenario 1. Evidence from subjects who cooperated in scenario 1 but not in
scenario 2 however, indicates that they changed more because greater temptation than
because of greater apprehension.
Our results also indicate that non-cooperation is due more to apprehension than
temptation when trust is low (scenario 3 and 4).  Evidence from non-cooperators
however does not suggest that a shorter time horizon renders apprehension stronger
compared to temptation in scenario 4 than in scenario 3. Moreover, we did not find
evidence that subjects, who cooperated in scenario 3 but not in scenario 4, choose non-
cooperation in scenario 4 more because of greater apprehension than because of
greater temptation. When both apprehension and temptation are high, subjects might
not be able to distinguish which is the stronger incentive - note that this distinction is
much easier to make in the other three contexts.
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3.3 Impact of Payoff Manipulations on Willingness to Cooperate Across Scenarios
3.3.1 Impact of Changes to p(C,N) and p(N,C) on Willingness to Cooperate
Figure 10 presents the impact of changing p(C,N) and p(N,C) on willingness to
cooperate9 across scenarios.
Figure 10. Impact of Payoff Manipulations on Willingness to Cooperation
Trust :                      90                   90                    10
10Time Horizon :       90                   10                    90
10







                                                
9 After subjects had decided on Option A or Option B, we manipulated the payoffs and
asked them to indicate the extent to which they would probably have chosen the other
option, given the manipulations. We therewith measure subjects’ willingness to change
from cooperation to non-cooperation and vice versa. We refer to the influence of
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We found that changes in p(N,C) do not have significantly greater impact on
willingness to cooperate than changes in p(C,N) in scenarios one and two (t1 = -0.376,
ns; t2 = 0.569, ns at 0.1 level)10.  Hypothesis 6 is not supported.  Changes in p(C,N),
however,  have significantly greater impact on willingness to cooperate than changes
in p(N,C) in scenarios three and four (t3 = -5.387, a<0.001, t4 = -3.372, a<0.001).
Hypothesis 7 is supported.
We suspect that the insignificance of hypothesis 6 is due to the fact that the subjects
respond more to p(C,N) than to p(N,C) because of asymmetric utility functions for
gains and losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rabin, 1998). Prospect theory argues
that utility functions for losses are steeper than those for gains, therefore, the utility
change caused by the manipulation of the fear element p(C,N) probably is greater than
that caused by manipulations of the greed element p(N,C).11 We tested whether
subjects on average responded more to changes in p(C,N) than p(N,C) across
scenarios. We found that there is a significant difference in means
(mCN(3.514)>mNC(3.947), t = 3.956, a<0.001). We adjust each subject’s raw scores
reflecting the impact of changes in p(CN) by subtracting the mean of these raw scores.
We made the same adjustment for changes to p(N,C). After the adjustment, changes in
p(N,C) have greater impact than changes in p(C,N) in scenarios 1 (t1 = 1.793,
a<0.038) and 2 (t2 = 3.260, a<0.002) while changes in p(C,N) and p(N,C) remain
significantly different in scenarios 3 (t3 = -4.764, a<0.001) and 4 (t4 = -1.740,
                                                
10 We pooled the responses of subjects who we motivated to change from cooperation
to non-cooperation with those of who we motivated to change from non-cooperation to
cooperation. This is because we have no reason to believe that the nature of the
responses from non-cooperators is different from that of responses from cooperators.
11 We draw an analogy between gains and losses and greed and fear, as greed
represents opportunistic gains and fear potential losses.
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a<0.043). Figure 11 presents the impact of changing p(C,N) and p(N,C) on
willingness to cooperate across scenarios after the adjustment.
Figure 11. Impact of Payoff Manipulations on Willingness to Cooperation
                  (After Adjusting for Differing Mean Responsiveness)
Trust :                90              90              10               10
Time Horizon :    90              10       90            10
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3.3.2 Impact of Changes to p(CC) and p(NN) on Willingness to Cooperate
Figure 12 presents the impact of changing p(C,C) and p(N,N) on willingness to
cooperate across scenarios. As hypothesized, significant differences were found
between manipulations of p(C,C) and p(N,N) in scenarios one, three and four (t1 =
1.883, a<0.032, t3 = -3.217, a<0.001, t4 = -1.929, a<0.029). However, no significant
difference was found in scenario two (t2 = 1.049, ns at 0.1 level).
Figure 12.  Impact of Payoff Manipulations on Willingness to Cooperate
Trust :                     90                   90                    10
10Time Horizon :      90                   10                    90
10







Because changes in p(C,C) affect the greed element and changes in p(NN) affect the
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than in p(C,C) across scenarios. No significant difference was found (mCC(3.725),
mNN(3.825), t = 0.906, ns at 0.1 level). These results support hypothesis 8 and provide
some indications for hypothesis 9.
Given the positive direction in the mean difference though, we adjusted the raw scores
by subtracting the means.  We found that, after adjusting, changing p(C,C) is
significantly more effective than changing p(N,N) in scenarios one and two (t1 =
3.025, a<0.002; t2 =1.867, a<0.033) and significantly less effective in scenarios three
and four (t3 = -3.969, a<0.001; t4 = -1.910, a<0.030). Figure 13 presents the impact of
changing p(C,C) and p(N,N) on willingness to cooperate across scenarios after the
adjustment.
Our results regarding the effectiveness of payoff manipulations in motivating
cooperation show that manipulating the payoffs that constitute greed is more effective
in motivating cooperation than manipulation those that constitute fear when trust is
high (scenarios 1 and 2). Our results also provide strong indications that manipulating
the payoffs that constitute fear is more effective in motivating cooperation than
manipulation those that constitute greed when trust is low (scenarios 3 and 4).
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Figure 13.  Impact of Payoff Manipulations on Willingness to Cooperate
                   (After Adjusting for Differing Mean Responsiveness)
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In summary, we first found that the level of trust determines whether the relational
context is dominated by apprehension or temptation. Second, there are indications that
time horizon determines the degree of apprehension and temptation dominance. Third,
the findings strongly support that in temptation dominant contexts payoff
manipulations affecting greed have greater impact on cooperation than those affecting
fear.  The opposite is found in apprehension dominant contexts.  This supports the
central idea behind this study that the impact of fear on cooperation is mediated by
apprehension, whereas the impact of greed is mediated by temptation.
Trust:      90   90              10              10






4. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presented an experiment to test the idea that the effectiveness of payoff
manipulations in influencing cooperation hinges on the relational context in which they
are embedded. While most studies have explored the interpersonal aspect and the
intertemporal aspect of the relational context in isolation, we consider their
simultaneous impact. Furthermore, while most studies examine how interpersonal and
intertemporal dynamics shape cooperation, this paper examines how payoff
manipulations most effectively promote cooperation given interpersonal and
intertemporal dynamics.   
We first hypothesized and tested that different comfigurations of the interpersonal
aspect (trust) and the intertemporal aspect (time horizon) of a relationship give rise to
different relational contexts of apprehension and temptation. We then hypothesized
and tested that the impact of payoff manipulations related to the concepts of benefit,
greed and fear on willingness to cooperate depends systematically on the nature of the
relational context. Our results broadly support the above hypotheses and provide
strong evidence against a context-free utility model, which would predict the same
effectiveness of payoff manipulations across relational contexts. Our research has
strong implication for both theory and practice.
With respect to theory, we draw attention to the holistic understanding of the context in
which ongoing-social exchanges are embedded. Both, trust and time horizon, have to
be considered together to provide a full picture of this context. Moreover, we provide
empirical support for the interdependence of payoff incentives and context parameters.
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This suggests that a holistic perspective incorporating both payoffs and context is
needed to make sense of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.
With regard to practice, we provide two insights. First, managers need to be aware that
trust alone does not foretell alliance success and distrust does not foreshadow alliance
breakdown. Similarly, long time horizon alone does not ensure successful cooperation
and short time horizon does not necessarily mean that alliances are doomed to fail.
There are many examples in the business world that illustrate these points. For
example, the alliance between Borden and Meiji Milk Products broke after twenty
years of close collaboration and high trust. Taco Bell placed trust in jeopardy when it
introduced Taco Bell Express which competed for business with its franchisees.
Nonetheless, the franchisees continued to work with Taco Bell despite strong
opposition to the newly introduced retail format. Moreover, abundant opportunities for
future cooperation were not able to keep Renault and Volvo together in the 1990s.
Lastly, it is not difficult to find cases that show short-term collaborations succeeding
especially when much trust keeps parties together. Ultimately, trust working in the
shadow of the future determines whether the context of a relationship is conducive to
cooperation or not. Second, managers need to have the relational context in mind when
they devise or alter the incentives. Incentives that alter potential losses (fear) should be
given priority over those that alter opportunistic gains (greed) when apprehension
dominates temptation, and vice versa. For example, alliance mangers should consider
granting control when they face an apprehensive partner while asking for commitment
when they deal with a tempted one.
Our research has limitations. Our sample consisted entirely of business undergraduate
students and participants were given assessments about trust and time horizon which
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they did not derive themselves. While this ensures a high degree of control and
reliability, it reduces realism. Future research may consider the use of a more diverse
sample and a design that allows subjects to derive expectations regarding trust and
time horizon themselves.
Another limitation of our study is that it cannot be ruled out that some subjects might
have based their decisions solely on trust, ignoring time horizon. The quiz that
participants answered, reassured us that they understood the operationalization of time
horizon, but it did not reveal to what extent they took time horizon into consideration
when they made their decisions. Our results, especially those regarding the payoff
manipulations, however, suggest that the majority of subjects did not ignore time
horizon. Future studies might investigate to what extent people base their cooperative
decision on trust and to what extent on time horizon. While it is unlikely that many
subjects ignored time horizon, it is more likely that some might not have perceived a
time horizon of 90% to be much longer than one of 10%. As a result, these subjects
would still have felt very tempted when faced with a time horizon of 90%. This might
explain the finding that scenario 1 is little different from scenario 2 and scenario 3 little
different from scenario 4 in terms of apprehension and temptation. This in turn would
suggest that people are not very sensitive to changes in time horizon.
While the within-subject design that the study employs ensures a high degree of
consistency, it brings with it some drawbacks. As each subject played all four
scenarios it cannot be ruled out that the first scenario might have fixated some subjects
on either temptation or apprehension for the entire experiment. Specifically, as that
scenario was characterized by 90% trust and a time horizon of 90%, some subjects
might have been fixated on reaping opportunistic gains (temptation). That means our
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results regarding payoff manipulations also have to be interpreted in the light of prior
research on framing manipulations that selectively emphasize the probability of
success (gain, or positive frame) versus emphasizing the probability of failure (loss, or
negative frame). It has been argued that presenting the probability of a particular
outcome of a risky option makes this outcome more salient and it has been
demonstrated that salient stimuli have a disproportionate influence on people's
attitudes and decisions (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, 1982;
van der Pliet &Eiser, 1984; Kühberger, 1998).
If subjects were in a gain frame for the entire experiment, it is no surprise that they
focused on opportunistic gains (temptation) rather than potential losses (apprehension),
even if the probability of gains was smaller than that for losses. Interestingly, while
subjects on average felt more tempted than apprehensive (be it because they have been
fixated or time horizon was not long enough to contain their temptation), they on
average did not respond more to changes in greed than fear. Our results suggest that
manipulating fear on average was more effective in promoting cooperation than
manipulating greed. This provides some indications that that people might be more
sensitive to changes to potential losses than changes to opportunistic gains. Taking into
account the possibility of different utility functions associated with greed, fear and
benefit is an important area for future extension of this research.
Lastly, we only look at four extreme configurations of trust and time horizon. The
natures of apprehension and temptation are certainly more intricate than what has been
revealed by these four stylized context. Future studies may consider the full range of
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Appendix A. Instructions
YOU
Option A Option B
Option A 450 600
OTHER
PERSON
Option B 150 300
You are going to play the above game for several rounds. The game is either likely to have
many rounds or few rounds. The actual number of rounds depends on a chance event.
o When we say the game is likely to have many rounds, we mean that after each round
there is a 90% chance  that the game continues.
o When we say the game is not likely to have many rounds, we mean that after each round
there is only a 10% chance that the game continues.
So you know the game will be over sooner or later, you just don't know in advance when it
will be over.
In addition, you will know how likely the other person is to choose Option A.
o When we say the other person is likely to choose Option A, we mean that there is a 90%
chance  that s/he will choose option A.
o When we say the other person is not likely to choose Option A, we mean that there is
only a 10% chance that s/he will choose Option A.
Since your decision will influence the other person's choice in future rounds, you don't know
exactly how likely the other person will choose Option A in future rounds.
It may seem obvious to you that Option B is the better choice, but it can be reasonably
expected that this action could bring about the same choice from the other person in the
future. As a result, you may get only 300 rather than 400 many times. In a sense, a choice of
Option B represents a non-cooperative move. While less risky, it could mean giving up long-
term benefits for short-term gains. Conversely, a choice of Option A represents a cooperative
move. While a bit risky (because the other person might choose Option B), it can be a good
choice if you think the other person will reciprocate and you can get 400 many times.
It is your task to maximize your own payoff without concern for the other person. Please note




Appendix B. Computer Interface used to Assess Impact of Changes
in Fear and Greed on Willingness to Cooperate*
Scenario 1, Round 1
o the other person is LIKELY to choose OPTION A in this round
o the game is LIKELY to have MANY ROUNDS
YOU
Option A         Option B
                            Option A               450                  600
       OTHER
      PERSON
                            Option B               150                  300
What is your decision for Round 1?
0      Option A
0      Option B
To what extent do you agree with the following
statements?**
I chose Option B in an attempt to get 600 in this round.
I chose Option B because if I choose Option A I am
afraid of getting only 150.
With 500 in the green cell I would probably have
chosen the other option.
With 250 in the red cell I would probably have chosen
the other option.
Strongly                                       Strongly
Disagree                                         Agree
   1      2      3      4      5      6      7
   1      2      3      4      5      6      7
   1      2      3      4      5      6      7
   1      2      3      4      5      6      7
* Shown here is the interface for condition 1 and scenario 1. The interface for
condition 2 and other scenarios are not shown.
** Statements shown here as those following a choice of Option B. Statements
following a choice of Option A are not shown.
red cell
green cell
